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I. INTRODUCTION
Attempts to inspect the records of the State of Alaska can be frus-
trating for the public, the press, and government officials because of
the uncertainty in Alaska as to what records are available for inspec-
tion. This frustration arises because Alaska, unlike most states and
the federal government,' does not have a comprehensive public
records act that clearly identifies what records are exempt from disclo-
sure. Instead, Alaska Statutes sections 09.25.110 and 09.25.1202 spec-
ify that all public writings and records, with a few noted exceptions,
are available for inspection.
In contrast, evidentiary privileges in Alaska are relatively
straightforward. There is, however, one constitutional privilege that
has just been recognized in Alaska and is deserving of close scrutiny.
That privilege, the "deliberative process privilege," protects from dis-
covery "predecisional" documents prepared by members of the execu-
tive branch that reflect the decisionmaking, or deliberative process, of
government officials. 3
Exemptions under the records inspection statutes are quite dis-
tinct from evidentiary privileges. A record that is exempt from disclo-
sure under the public records statutes is not necessarily privileged
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1. See infra note 45 and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.110, 09.25.120 (1983). See infra text accompanying
notes 13-14.
3. Most courts and commentators refer to this as the "executive privilege." See
infra note 23. This reference is confusing, however, because the term also may be used
to refer to the narrower privilege held by the chief executive of the government. See
infra note 101. The Alaska Supreme Court has just recently recognized the "executive
privilege" of the governor to withhold from discovery documents that reflect his
predecisional mental processes. Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska
1986). Although it is not entirely clear, the court apparently intended to recognize
what is referred to in this article as the "deliberative process privilege," rather than
the narrower executive privilege held by the governor alone. See infra notes 160-61
and accompanying text.
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from discovery in litigation.4 Similarly, evidentiary privileges are not
state laws requiring records to be kept confidential under a particular
statute.
5
Government records must be made available for inspection by the
public or produced in discovery unless there is an applicable exception
or privilege authorizing nondisclosure. The issue that arises most fre-
quently, and thus the major focus of this article, is whether authority
exists for withholding a document from inspection or discovery. 6 If,
however, disclosure or production is prohibited by statute,7 or would
violate an individual's right of privacy," a state agency must withhold
the document. Accordingly, an agency must consider carefully all re-
quests for inspection of public records and production of records in
discovery.
Section II of this article briefly compares exceptions to the
records inspection statutes with evidentiary privileges. Because the ex-
ceptions and privileges are governed by separate principles, they must
be clearly differentiated before each is analyzed in detail. Section III
discusses Alaska's records inspection statutes. First, this section
presents background information necessary for a complete under-
standing of the statutes and Alaska's position on access to public
records. This discussion will include an examination of the statutory
language employed by the Alaska Legislature and a discussion of an
analogous statute that provides a useful point of reference, Alaska's
Open Meetings Act. Section III next discusses the exceptions to the
general rule of disclosure. These include express and implied statutory
exceptions, exceptions required by the Alaska Constitution, and the
common law "public interest" exception. This section finally discusses
special issues that arise when a public official determines that a docu-
ment should not be inspected. These issues include the point in time
at which a document ceases to be confidential, whether government
agencies can share confidential records, and the procedural require-
ments that are applicable when an agency has determined that a rec-
ord should not be inspected. Finally, section IV addresses the
deliberative process privilege, examining first its development in other
jurisdictions and then its probable application in Alaska. This article
concludes that the deliberative process privilege will not be interpreted
as broadly in Alaska as it has been in other jurisdictions because of
Alaska's commitment to allowing the fullest possible access to govern-
ment records.
4. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
6. See infra sections III(B) and IV.
7. See infra sections III(B)(1) and III(B)(2).
8. See infra section III(B)(3).
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II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RECORDS INSPECTION STATUTES
COMPARED WITH EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
The inspection of government records by the public is governed
by Alaska Statutes sections 09.25.110 and 09.25.1209 and the imple-
menting regulations. 10 The right of the public to inspect records must
be distinguished from the right of parties in litigation to discover cer-
tain documents, which is governed primarily by Alaska Evidence Rule
501.11 Limitations on the two are not co-extensive and thus terminol-
ogy is important. Public writings and records are subject to inspection
unless they fall within one of the exceptions enumerated in section
09.25.120. If an exception applies, the records are exempt from disclo-
sure. On the other hand, relevant materials are subject to discovery
unless they are privileged. In Alaska, exceptions to the public records
statutes are not treated as evidentiary privileges and, likewise, eviden-
tiary privileges are not recognized as exceptions to the records inspec-
tion statutes. 12
A. Records Inspection Statutes
Section 09.25.110, which states the general rule that public
records are available for inspection, provides as follows:
Unless specifically provided otherwise, the books, records, papers,
files, accounts, writings and transactions of all agencies and depart-
ments are public records and are open to inspection by the public
under reasonable rules during regular office hours. The public of-
ficer having the custody of public records shall give on request and
payment of costs a certified copy of the public record. 13
Section 09.25.120 restates the general rule of availability, but sets out
four exceptions. The section provides in relevant part as follows:
Every person has a right to inspect a public writing or record in the
state, including public writings and records in recorder's offices ex-
cept (1) records of vital statistics and adoption proceedings which
shall be treated in the manner required by AS [Alaska Statutes]
9. See infra text accompanying notes 13-14.
10. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, §§ 95.010-.050 (Apr. 1984), 95.060-.900 (Jan.
1983).
11. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
12. Various statutes address separately the confidentiality of a document under
the records inspection statutes and its privilege from discovery. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 08.24.250 (1987) (information is confidential, but may be introduced in evi-
dence); id. § 09.25.100 (1983) (information shall be kept confidential except when pro-
duction required in investigation or court proceeding); id. § 18.23.030 (1986)
(information is both confidential and not subject to subpoena or discovery).
13. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.110 (1983).
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18.50.010 - 18.50.380; (2) records pertaining to juveniles; (3) medi-
cal and related public health records; (4) records required to be kept
confidential by a federal law or regulation or by state law.14
The first three exceptions are clear and thus do not warrant discussion.
In contrast, the fourth and broadest exception requires close scrutiny,
especially because its contours have not yet been defined by the Alaska
Supreme Court.
The term "state law," used in the fourth exception, obviously re-
fers to any statute requiring records to be kept confidential. 15 The
term also refers to any constitutional provision, most notably the right
of privacy,1 6 which requires confidentiality. 17 Finally, as the Alaska
Supreme Court has twice indicated in recent opinions,18 the reference
to "state law" in this statute also includes the common law. 19 The
common law on public inspection of government records, as developed
in other jurisdictions and acknowledged in Alaska, provides that in-
spection should be denied when such an inspection would be against
the "public interest."'20
B. The Deliberative Process Evidentiary Privilege
Alaska Evidence Rule 501 governs evidentiary privileges and pro-
vides, in relevant part, as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or of this state, by enactments of the Alaska Legislature, or
by these or other rules promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court,
no person, organization, or entity has a privilege to ... refuse to
produce any object or writing .... 2 1
The evidentiary privileges created by statutes and court rules are
relatively straightforward. The "deliberative process" privilege,22
14. Id. § 09.25.120 (1983).
15. See infra sections III(B)(1), III(B)(2).
16. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
17. See infra section III(B)(3).
18. City of Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula Newspapers, 642 P.2d 1316 (Alaska 1982);
Carter v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 663 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1983).
19. See infra section III(B)(4).
20. Id.
21. ALASKA R. EVID. 501.
22. See generally Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 360 (1979);
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478
F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F.
Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318
(D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES (1983); Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for
Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1047 (1973); Annotation, Construction
and Application, Under State Law, of Doctrine of "Executive Privilege," 10 A.L.R. 4TH
355 (1981).
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frequently identified by courts and commentators as the "executive
privilege, '23 however, deserves extended comment. This privilege
arises under the separation of powers provisions of the state constitu-
tion and, when necessary to protect the public interest, shields from
discovery in litigation recommendations and opinions exchanged in
the course of governmental decisionmaking.24
Evidentiary privileges are not per se recognizable as exceptions to
the records inspection statutes.25 Nevertheless, a record privileged
from discovery under the deliberative process privilege probably also
would be exempt from public inspection under the common law "pub-
lic interest" exception to the records inspection statutes.26
III. THE RECORDS INSPECTION STATUTES
As in all other states,27 the right of the public to inspect govern-
ment records in Alaska is governed by statute. Alaska's records in-
spection statutes, sections 09.25.110 and 09.25.120, are facially very
23. See, e.g., Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 353 (1979);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 51 (4th Cir. 1973); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom V.E.B. Carl Zeiss,
Jena v. Clark (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); Hamilton v. Verdow, 287
Md. 544, 553-54, 414 A.2d 914, 920 (Md. 1980); Annotation, Construction andAppli-
cation, Under State Law, of Doctrine of "Executive Privilege," 10 A.L.R. 4TH 355
(1981).
24. See infra section IV.
25. See Playboy Enterprises v. Department of Justice, 677 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), wherein the court stated:
We reject the argument that because the government's claim of privilege
with respect to the Rowe Report had been sustained in discovery proceed-
ings in other cases the District Court ought to have given 'controlling
weight' to those determinations .... [T]he issues in discovery proceedings
and the issues in the context of a FOIA action are quite different. That for
one reason or another a document may be exempt from discovery does not
mean that it will be exempt from a demand under FOIA.
Id. See also Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co., 372 So. 2d 420, 424 (Fla. 1979) ("If
the common law privileges are to be included as exemptions, it is up to the legislature,
and not this Court, to amend the [public records] statute."). Accordingly, ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 95.010(b) (Apr. 1984), is misleading in stating that records are
not subject to inspection if nondisclosure is "authorized by... a privilege... recog-
nized by the courts."
26. This is because both involve a balancing test that weighs the interest in disclo-
sure against the public interest in nondisclosure. See infra sections III(B)(4) and IV.
Inasmuch as a party has an identifiable interest in the discovery of documents in litiga-
tion and the public has only a general, albeit important, interest in the inspection of
government records, if a particular document would be privileged from discovery
under the deliberative process privilege, it is likely that the document would also be
exempt from disclosure under the public interest exception. Id.
27. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6267 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 116, paras. 43.4.28, 43.101.103a, 43.113 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987);
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65,
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broad. They provide that every public writing or record in the state is
available for inspection by the public unless an identifiable exception
exists.28 Given their obvious importance, these statutes will be ana-
lyzed in detail.
A. Background
1. Statutory Terms. Section 09.25.110 contains two terms that
are particularly important. The first is, naturally enough, "public
records." The second is the term "reasonable rules," referring to the
conditions that the government may place upon the exercise of the
right to inspect public records. Almost all public records acts contain
a similar provision, dictating that inspection is to be permitted at rea-
sonable times or under reasonable conditions. 29 Generally speaking,
how a state defines "public records" and how it interprets a "reason-
able conditions" provision is indicative of how narrowly or broadly
the remaining portions of the state's public records act will be
interpreted.
Only "public records" or "writings" are subject to inspection
under public records acts. Several states have interpreted these terms
narrowly so as to disallow the inspection of various documents. 30 In
§§ 66.1-.4 (Purdon 1959 & Supp. 1987); see also other statutes cited in 2 B.
BRAVERMAN & F. CHETWYND, INFORMATION LAW 1113-17 app. (1985).
28. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
29. See statutes cited in 2 B. BRAVERMAN & F. CHETWYND, supra note 27, at
1113-17.
30. See, e.g., Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893 (1952); Butera v. Com-
monwealth, 29 Pa. Commonw. 343, 370 A.2d 1248 (1977). See generally Annotation,
What Are "Records" ofAgency Which Must Be Made Available Under State Freedom
of Information Act, 27 A.L.R. 4TH 680 (1983).
Under federal law, only "agency records" are available for inspection. The test of
what constitutes an "agency record" focuses on both the physical possession of the
document and its intended use. In one of the leading cases on this point, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that notes of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations
in the possession of the State Department were not "agency records." Kissinger v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980). The Court summa-
rily rejected any claim to notes that had once been in the possession of the State De-
partment but had subsequently been transferred to a private entity. Id. at 150. With
respect to those notes in the physical possession of the State Department, the Court
concluded that the records were of conversations that occurred while Dr. Kissinger
worked within the office of the President, an office not covered under the Freedom of
Information Act. Id at 156.
Lower federal courts have similarly concluded that mere physical possession is
not sufficient to transform a document into an "agency record," and have thus ex-
tended the Kissinger analysis to focus on the agencies' intended function or use of the
document. See, e.g., Illinois Inst. for Continuing Legal Education v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 545 F. Supp. 1229, 1234-35 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Applying this analysis, a
federal court recently ruled that telephone message slips reflecting both business and
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Alaska, this possibility has been foreclosed by the legislature, which
has defined "public records" in section 09.25.110 to include "the
books, records, papers, files, accounts, writings and transactions of all
agencies and departments." This listing clearly was intended to estab-
lish a broad definition for the term "public record."
The term "public records" has also been addressed by the Alaska
Supreme Court and in the state's regulations. In one case, the Alaska
Supreme Court noted that if "the records [are] kept by a public entity,
they [are] subject to disclosure."'31 One of the regulations implement-
ing section 09.25.110 similarly defines "records" to include all materi-
als "developed or received under law or in the transaction of official
business."' 32 Although the legislature intended a broad definition of
"public records," these statements may nonetheless be too broad. It is
conceivable that some materials in the government's possession are not
public records. Thus, given an unusual situation, it may be appropri-
ate to question whether the requested materials are public records sub-
ject to disclosure under section 09.25.110. Generally, however, almost
anything kept by an agency to document a communication, including
a draft document, is a "public record."
33
Section 09.25.110 provides that inspection is to be permitted
under "reasonable rules." Presumably, this term means at reasonable
times and under reasonable conditions. Some courts have used similar
provisions to temper their public records acts' mandate of disclosure.
For example, in State v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 34 the
Florida Court of Appeals held that the government may postpone
public disclosure of its investigatory materials for a "reasonable time"
until it has either dismissed the charge as groundless or has deter-
mined that there is substantial evidence of a violation of law.35
personal calls, as well as personal appointment calendars created for the personal con-
venience of a government official, were not "agency records" subject to disclosure
under federal law. Bureau of National Affairs v. United States Dep't of Justice, 742
F.2d 1484, 1495-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
31. Carter v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 663 P.2d 916, 919 (Alaska 1983).
32. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 95.900(4) (Jan. 1983).
33. The records inspection statutes, however, have no bearing on whether or not
the agency has a duty to preserve the records. That duty must be analyzed separately
under the archival statutes. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 40.21.010-.150 (1971). The
records inspection statutes merely provide that an agency must disclose the public
records it has unless the record is exempt from disclosure. If a record has been law-
fully destroyed in accordance with an approved records retention schedule, it need
not, and indeed cannot, be available for inspection.
34. 341 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
35. Id. at 1003. The court stated: "The Public Records Act does not contemplate
that the public and interested parties are entitled to dog the investigator's footsteps
and peer at his notes as they are written. Nothing short of an explicit statutory imper-
ative should require the Commission's preliminary investigation to be so compro-
mised." Id.
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The apparent purpose of the provision, however, is to grant some
latitude to agencies in how quickly they must respond to a request for
inspection and the degree of effort they must expend to identify and
produce the records sought for inspection. This interpretation is re-
flected in the regulations implementing the inspection of public
records in Alaska.36 Without such latitude, requests for inspection
could become disruptive to the operation of government.
Although the procedural benefits of the "reasonable rules" provi-
sion in section 09.25.110 are significant, the provision does not consti-
tute a substantive exception to the disclosure mandate in Alaska.37
For example, although no one has the right under section 09.25.110 to
hover over the shoulders of a public official and demand to inspect a
document as it rolls off the printer, a request for inspection cannot be
denied simply because the document sought is not yet in final form.
2. Records Inspection Statutes Compared with the Open Meetings
Act. A close relative of the records inspection statutes is the Open
Meetings Act,38 which specifies when government meetings must be
conducted in public and when closed sessions are permissible. While
there is no direct relationship between the two, the Open Meetings Act
is closely analogous to the records inspection statutes because both
recognize that circumstances exist when full disclosure would be con-
trary to the public interest. Furthermore, the circumstances in which
the legislature has specified that closed meetings are permissible pro-
vide guidance as to the kinds of subject matter in documents that
probably should be withheld from public inspection under the com-
mon law public interest exception. For example, section 44.62.310
specifies that "matters, the immediate knowledge of which would
clearly have an adverse effect upon the finances of the government
unit," may be discussed in an executive or closed session.39 Accord-
ingly, an argument can be made that documents, "the immediate
knowledge of which would clearly have an adverse effect upon the fi-
nances of the goernment unit," are exempt from inspection by the
public because disclosure would be contrary to the public interest.
36. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, §§ 95.070-.900 (Jan. 1983).
37. A brief review of the legislative history of Alaska's records inspection statutes,
as presented by the Alaska Supreme Court in City of Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula News-
papers, also makes it clear that the statute's terms are not to be construed so as to
provide loopholes for nondisclosure. In this decision, the court pointed out that
Alaska has consistently favored broad access to government records. In the course of
deciding that the records inspection laws apply to the inspection of municipal as well
as state records, the Kenai court highlighted the legislature's intent to create a broad
presumption in favor of disclosure. City of Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula Newspapers,
642 P.2d 1316, 1319-25 (Alaska 1982).
38. ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.310-.312 (Supp. 1987).
39. Id. § 44.62.310(c)(1).
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The greater significance of the Open Meetings Act, however, may
be its recognition of Alaska's high degree of commitment to open gov-
ernment. When discussing the public's right to inspect records, the
Alaska Supreme Court has referred to the legislature's statement of
policy in the Open Meetings Act. In City ofKenai v. Kenai Peninsula
Newspapers, 40 the Alaska Supreme Court quoted from Alaska Statute
section 44.62.312(a): "(4) the people, in delegating authority, do not
give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the peo-
ple to know and what is not good for them to know, '41 and "(5) the
people's right to remain informed shall be protected so that they may
retain control over the instruments they have created." 42 The Alaska
Supreme Court found this policy statement to be indicative of the
"strong public interest in [the] disclosure of the affairs of govern-
ment" 43 that must be borne in mind when analyzing public records
issues.
B. Exceptions to the Requirement of Public Disclosure
Exceptions to the general requirement of disclosure exist because
government cannot operate effectively if the public is given unbridled
access to all records. Furthermore, unrestricted access can infringe
upon the rights of individuals discussed in the records. Accordingly,
exceptions to the mandate of disclosure must and do exist.
Alaska is one of only a few states44 that has not enacted a com-
prehensive public records act setting out a definitive list of exceptions
to the general rule of disclosure or expressly recognizing common law
exceptions.45 Instead, the exceptions to the requirement of disclosure
are as follows:
40. 642 P.2d 1316 (Alaska 1982).
41. Id. at 1324 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.312(a)(4) (Supp. 1987)).
42. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.312(a)(5) (Supp. 1987)).
43. Id. at 1323.
44. ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (Supp. 1986) ("Every citizen has a right to inspect and
take a copy of any public writing of this state, except as otherwise expressly provided
by statute."); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1985) ("Public records and other
matters in the office of any officer at all times during office hours shall be open to
inspection by any person."); IDAHO CODE § 59-1009 (1976) ("The public records and
other matters in the office of any officer are, at all times during office hours, open to
the inspection of any citizen of this state."); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 109.180-.190
(Vernon 1966); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-5-101 to -111 (1985); NEv. REV. STAT.
§§ 239.010-.080, 378.290-.300 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1A-1 to :1A-4 (West
1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1 (Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 44-04-01 to -18
(1978 & Supp. 1987).
45. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6267 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-72-201 to -206 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19 to 1-21K (West
1969 & Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 10001-10005 (1983 & Supp. 1986);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.01-.14 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116,
paras. 201-211 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-3-1 to -10 (Burns
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(1) records of vital statistics and adoption proceedings which shall
be treated in the manner required by AS [Alaska Statutes]
18.50.010-18.50.380; (2) records pertaining to juveniles; (3) medi-
cal and related public health records; (4) records required to be
kept confidential by a federal law or regulation or by state law.
46
The first three exceptions listed in section 09.25.120, relating to
vital statistics and adoption proceedings, juvenile records, and medical
and public health records, are self-explanatory and require no discus-
sion. The fourth exception, however, which exempts "records re-
quired to be kept confidential by a federal law or regulation or by state
law,"'4 7 warrants extensive discussion. It is beyond the scope of this
article to analyze applicable federal laws and regulations.48 Instead,
the following discussion will focus on state laws that prevent the dis-
closure of certain records. These include express statutory provisions,
implied statutory provisions, constitutional provisions, and the com-
mon law.49
Before turning to these specific exceptions, however, one last mat-
ter deserves comment. Section 09.25.120 specifies that all records are
1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-.12 (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-201
to -225 (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.870-.884 (Baldwin 1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1979); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-611 to -624
(1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 4, §§ 7, 26 (Law. Co-op. 1987); id. ch. 66, § 10; MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15.231-.244 (West 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-61-1 to -17
(1986); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-712 to -712.05 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 91-
A:I to :8 (1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.410-.500 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65
§§ 66.1 to 66.4 (Purdon 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 38-2-1 to -12 (1986); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-4-10 to -90 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10-7-503 to -508 (1986); TEx.
CIv. CODE ANN., art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 315-
320 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.250-
.940, 42.18.130-.300 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 29B-1-1 to -6 (1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19.25-.39 (West 1986 & Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. §§ 16-4-201 to -205
(1982).
46. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.120 (1983).
47. Id.
48. It should be noted, however, that a record is "required to be kept confidential
by a federal law or regulation," ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.120(4) (1983), only if the fed-
eral law or regulation is specifically applicable to the record.
49. Rules promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court pursuant to article IV, sec-
tion 15, of the Alaska Constitution may also have the force and effect of law. Thus,
for example, Alaska Bar Rule 22(b), which provides that disciplinary and disability
proceedings are confidential prior to the initiation of formal proceedings, constitutes
an exception to the disclosure requirements of ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.120 (1983).
In contrast, regulations are never "state laws" that can, in and of themselves,
authorize an agency to keep materials confidential. A regulation providing for the
confidentiality of designated documents is valid only if the requirement of confidenti-
ality is supported by a statute, by the constitution, or by the common law. Further-
more, the regulation must be reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of the
authorizing statute or other state law. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.030 (1984).
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subject to inspection "except ... records required to be kept confiden-
tial by... law."50 This phrase presumably means required to be kept
confidential by law under the particular circumstances because there
are various statutes that authorize, rather than require, confidentiality,
and these statutes could not be given effect unless section 09.25.120
were so interpreted.51
1. Express Statutory Exceptions. The exception to the records in-
spection statute for records required to be kept confidential by "state
law" clearly includes statutes that require or authorize nondisclosure
of government records. There are more than 100 such statutes. 52
When a request is made to inspect a document, the confidentiality or
disclosure of which appears to be addressed by a statute, the provi-
sions of the statute must be examined. In almost all situations, the
statute will be dispositive.
Some statutes expressly require the custodian of the records to
perform this type of balancing test when a request for disclosure is
made. For example, one statute requires the Alaska Department of
Law, as the governmental body responsible for prosecuting criminal
offenses, to make the determination as to whether information about
suspected arson is disclosable.53 The vast majority of statutes, how-
ever, are more facially absolute. Indeed, some statutes are remarkably
50. ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.120(4) (1983) (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., id. § 21.06.130 (1986) (authorizing the director of insurance to with-
hold certain records from public inspection "for so long as the director considers the
withholding to be necessary for the protection of the person examined against unwar-
ranted injury or to be in the public interest"). See also Id. § 21.89.050(f) (1984); id.
§ 34.45.290 (Supp. 1987); id. § 38.06.060 (1984); id. § 42.05.671 (1983).
52. The only practicable means by which to discover these statutes is to gain ac-
cess to the state's computer network, which contains a data base that includes the text
of all statutes. (This database is referred to as "STAIRS.") A search can then be
performed for all statutes containing words such as "disclosure," and "confidential."
The eff'ort that this requires demonstrates one of the serious disadvantages of the state
not having a comprehensive public records act.
53. ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.050 (1984). The statute provides in pertinent part as
follows:
An authorized agency shall share with the insurer all relevant information
relating to an instance of suspected arson when (1) the Department of Law
has determined that release of the information would not jeopardize the suc-
cess of an ongoing investigation and that there are adequate safeguards to
insure the confidentiality of the information ....
Id. § 21.89.050(f).
Another statute, ALASKA STAT. § 21.06.150 (1984), provides as follows: "The
director may withhold from public inspection an examination or investigation report
for as long as the director considers the withholding to be necessary for the protection
of the person examined against unwarranted injury or to be in the public interest." Id.
§ 21.06.150(e).
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detailed in expressing what types of disclosure are prohibited. An ex-
ample of this is the statute prohibiting the "misuse of public assistance
lists and records," which provides as follows:
Except for purposes directly connected with the administration of
general assistance, adult public assistance, the day care assistance
program authorized under AS [Alaska Statutes] 44.47.250 -
44.47.310, or aid to families with dependent children, and in ac-
cordance with the regulations of the department, a person may not
solicit, disclose, receive, make use of, or authorize, knowingly per-
mit, participate in, or acquiesce in the use of, a list of or names of,
or information concerning, persons applying for or receiving the
assistance directly or indirectly derived from the records, papers,
files, or communications of the department or subdivisions or agen-
cies of the department, or acquired in the course of the performance
of official duties.54
The legislative intent to restrict severely the disclosure of this type of
information could hardly be clearer. There are other statutes, such as
the one relating to preparole reports, which also attempt to address
every conceivable situation:
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, the preparole
reports listed in AS [Alaska Statutes] 33.16.110, and other informa-
tion obtained and used by the board under this chapter are confi-
dential and may not be disclosed to anyone other than the board,
the sentencing judge, the prosecuting and defense attorneys, the
prisoner, the prisoner's attorney, the attorney for the board, the
staff of the board, or others granted access to this information under
this chapter.
(b) Notwithstanding (a) of this section and AS [Alaska Stat-
utes] 33.16.130(b), in a preparole proceeding under AS [Alaska
Statutes] 33.16.130 the board may not disclose to the prisoner or the
prisoner's attorney
(1) diagnostic opinions that, if made known to the eligi-
ble prisoner, could lead to serious disruption of the prisoner's
institutional program;
(2) portions of a document that reveal sources of infor-
mation obtained upon a promise of confidentiality; or
(3) other information that, if disclosed, may result in
physical harm to any other person.
(c) When the board withholds information from a prisoner or
the prisoner's attorney under (b) of this section, the board shall pro-
vide the prisoner with an excised copy of the material or a summary
of the material withheld containing as much specificity as the cir-
cumstances allow.55
In a few instances, a public official may reasonably conclude that
the express statutory exception was not intended to govern the situa-
tion at hand. In such a situation, that official must then balance the
54. Id. § 47.05.030 (1984).
55. Id. § 33.16.170 (1986).
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interest in disclosure against the interest in nondisclosure under the
common law public interest exception.5 6 One example can be derived
from the statute specifying that traffic accident reports filed with the
Division of Motor Vehicles are "confidential and private. ' 57 The stat-
ute does not address whether the persons involved in the accident may
obtain copies of the report. A plausible interpretation of the statute is
that the express confidentiality provision is intended to protect the pri-
vacy interests of those involved in the accident, rather than to hinder
those persons from ascertaining the contents of the accident report.
Thus, the provision might be interpreted as prohibiting only disclosure
of the reports to the general public. In that case, it would be appropri-
ate, under the common law public interest exception, to balance the
interests of the persons involved in the accident against the govern-
ment's interest in confidentiality. This interpretation would be consis-
tent with the policy that "exceptions to the disclosure requirements of
the public records statute are to be construed narrowly. '5 8
2. Implied Statutory Exceptions. In rare instances, an examna-
tion of an entire statutory scheme may reveal that the legislature did
not intend certain records to be made available for public inspection,
even though there is no statute expressly requiring or authorizing the
confidentiality of the documents. One example of this is information
relating to collective bargaining under the Public Employment Rela-
tions Act.59 There is no statutory provision addressing the confidenti-
ality of various documents relied upon during the collective bargaining
process. The entire statutory scheme, however, makes apparent the
fact that the legislature did not intend section 09.25.120 to be used by
employee organizations to obtain records that would inhibit the state's
ability to engage in good faith bargaining.
Implied statutory exceptions to sections 09.25.110 and 09.25.120,
however, should not be common. It is altogether too easy to imagine
situations in which an agency official, reluctant to disclose a particular
56. See infra section III(B)(4).
57. ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.151(f) (1984).
58. Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d at 622. See infra section III(B)(4).
In Grodjesk v. Faghani, 198 N.J. Super. 449, 456, 487 A.2d 759, 762 (1985), the
court held that a person who was investigated by the government should be able to
discover after the investigation who the complainant was. Similarly, in Louisiana ex
rel. Delcuze, 407 So. 2d 707, 710-11 (La. 1981), the court held that a child's parents
were entitled to the reports and records alleging their parental neglect, even though
the records were normally considered confidential.
59. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.070-.260 (1984).
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document, would be tempted to conclude that the legislature "in-
tended" certain records to be kept confidential. Before an implied ex-
ception to the public inspection statutes is found, the conclusion must
be clearly warranted.6°
3. Constitutional Exceptions. The reference to exceptions re-
quired "by state law" includes any constitutional requirement that a
document be kept confidential. The most frequently applicable consti-
tutional provision is the right of privacy, which is protected by article
I, section 22, of the Alaska Constitution. 61 The relationship between
an individual's right of privacy and the public's right to the disclosure
of records has twice been addressed by the Alaska Supreme Court.
In Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Commission,62 the Alaska
Supreme Court discussed the relationship between the right of privacy
and the public's interest in the disclosure of certain types of informa-
tion communicated in the context of a physician-patient relationship.63
The Falcon case involved an appeal by a physician from a ruling that,
as a member of a school board, he was statutorily required to disclose
the names of patients from whom he had received more than a certain
amount of income. The physician argued that the statute, which had
60. Once again, recall the admonition of the Alaska Supreme Court in Doe v.
Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d 617, 622 (Alaska 1986), that the interpretation of
statutes must be consistent with the policy expressed by the legislature in favor of
open government.
61. Another state law premised on the state constitution that requires records to
be kept confidential is the "executive privilege" of the governor to fulfill the duties of
his office without being subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as the rest of the state
government. The term "executive privilege," when used to describe an exception to
the records inspection statutes, is unfortunate because it should be reserved for refer-
ence to evidentiary privileges that are applicable in litigation. See infra section IV.
The governor's executive privilege arises from the separation of powers provi-
sions in the state constitution. In Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 534
P.2d 947 (Alaska 1975), the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of the
separation of powers doctrine as follows:
Although the Alaska Constitution does not expressly address itself to the
doctrine of separation of powers, we have noted that often what is implied is
as much a part of the constitution as what is expressed. The state constitu-
tion is divided into a number of separate articles. Since Article III concerns
the executive branch, it can fairly be implied that this state does recognize
the separation of powers doctrine.
Id. at 950 (citation omitted). See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974).
62. 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977).
63. Falcon sought declaratory relief from the provision of the Alaska "conflict of
interest" law, which requires candidates for public office to identify persons from
whom they received more than $100 in income during the past calendar year.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.50.010-.200 (1987).
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the effect of requiring him to reveal the identities of his patients, vio-
lated their constitutional rights of privacy. In response, the court indi-
cated that even when privacy interests are implicated, full public
disclosure for valid governmental purposes is not automatically pro-
hibited. Instead, a balancing test must be applied to determine
whether the degree of intrusion outweighs the public's interest in
disclosure.64
The relationship between the right of privacy and full disclosure
was also discussed in Doe v. Alaska Superior Court.65 In Doe, the
Alaska Supreme Court elaborated on what types of information impli-
cate the right to privacy. The court noted that the "common thread
woven into our decisions is that privacy protection extends to the com-
munication of 'private matters,'.., or, phrased differently, 'sensitive
personal information,'... or 'a person's more intimate concerns.' "66
The court then stated that "[t]his is the type of personal information
which, if disclosed even to a friend, could cause embarrassment or
anxiety." 67 In accordance with these standards, the Doe court held
that "the right of privacy is not implicated when an individual volun-
tarily sends an unsolicited letter to a public official commenting on a
public issue such as the appointment of a state officer," 68 because the
letter was intended to influence the official's decision on an issue of
public concern.
These decisions indicate that the right to privacy is an important
exception to the statutory mandate that the public be allowed to in-
spect government records. They also indicate, however, that the right
to privacy is not per se more important than the public's right to know
what the government is doing. Instead, when the right to privacy is
implicated, a balancing test must be performed to establish which in-
terest, under the particular circumstances, weighs more heavily.
If a state agency determines that the degree of intrusion that
would occur outweighs the public's interest in disclosure, the docu-
ment must be withheld from inspection. Disclosure of the document
under such circumstances would constitute an impermissible violation
64. Falcon, 570 P.2d at 476-78. The court ultimately concluded that, in most
situations, the public's interest in disclosure would outweigh the patient's rights of
privacy, but that the agency should adopt regulations recognizing exceptions to this.
Id. at 480.
65. 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska 1986).
66. Id. at 629 (citations omitted).
67. Id. These are all paraphrases of the ultimate standard, eloquently expressed
in Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), which holds that the right of privacy
protects information that is "none of [anyone else's] business." Id. at 504. Ravin
further explained that "[w]hen a matter does affect the public, directly or indirectly, it
loses its wholly private character, and can be made to yield when an appropriate pub-
lic need is demonstrated." Id.
68. Doe, 721 P.2d at 629.
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of the individual's right of privacy. If, on the other hand, an agency
determines that the public's interest in disclosure outweighs the indi-
vidual's right of privacy, the agency should notify the affected individ-
ual so that he or she has the opportunity to seek judicial review before
release of the record occurs. 69 Although this process may cause delay
in responding to the request for inspection, there are no other ade-
quate means available to protect the privacy interest of the person re-
ferred to in the documents. In short, an improper disclosure cannot be
undone.
4. Common Law Exceptions. A distinct pattern among state
courts can be discerned whereby the less specific a state's public
records act is the more likely it is that the state court will recognize
the authority of the judiciary and the executive to determine that some
documents should not be subject to immediate inspection by the pub-
lic. 70 Although some courts have achieved this result by defining nar-
rowly the term "public record," or using a stretched interpretation of
69. See 2 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 50.100 (Apr. 1986) (adopted by the
Alaska Public Offices Commission in response to the court's decision in Falcon). This
regulation outlines the procedures to be followed when a person claims that informa-
tion required to be disclosed under the public interest laws is exempt from such disclo-
sure under the right of privacy.
70. Compare Stone v. Consolidated Publishing Co., 404 So. 2d 678, 681 (Ala.
1981) ("It would be helpful for the legislative department to provide the limitations by
statute as some states have done. Absent legislative action, however, the judiciary
must apply the rule of reason.") (citation omitted); Church of Scientology v. City of
Phoenix Police Dep't, 122 Ariz. 338, 339, 594 P.2d 1034, 1035 (1979) (holding that
courts generally should determine if release of certain information would have "an
important and harmful effect upon the official duties of the official or agency") (cita-
tion omitted); Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 221, 386 A.2d 846, 851 (1978); New
Mexico ex rel. Newsom v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 797, 568 P.2d 1236, 1243 (1977) ("It
would be helpful to the courts for the Legislature to delineate what records are subject
to public inspection and those that should be kept confidential in the public interest.
Until the Legislature gives us direction in this regard, the courts will have to apply the
'rule of reason' to each claim for public inspection as they arise."), with State ex rel
Div. of Indus. Safety v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. App. 3d 778, 783, 117 Cal. Rptr. 726
(1974) (emphasis placed on the "specific exceptions to the general policy that are enu-
merated in the [California Public Records] Act"); Wait v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
372 So. 2d 420, 425 (Fla. 1979) (if common law privileges are to be included as exemp-
tions, legislature must amend statute); Cleveland Newspapers v. Bradley County Me-
morial Hosp. Bd. of Directors, 621 S.W. 2d 763, 765 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) ("only the
legislature can declare certain records to be confidential").
One exception to this pattern is Idaho. The operative provision of its public
records act merely states: "Every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any
public writing of this state, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute." IDAHO
CODE § 9-301 (1979) (emphasis added). There is no listing of exceptions in the act
itself. Instead, various provisions are scattered throughout the statutes relating to
confidentiality. In Dalton v. Idaho Dairy Products Comm'n, 684 P.2d 983 (Idaho
1984), the Supreme Court of Idaho interpreted this statute and held that it was not at
[Vol. 4:277
1987] INSPECTION AND DISCOVERY OF RECORDS 293
"reasonable conditions,"' 71 the sounder method is to recognize the
common law "public interest" exception to the records inspection stat-
utes.72 In accordance with a well-established line of authority that has
been recognized twice with approval by the Alaska Supreme Court,73
it seems clear that the phrase "except as provided by ... state law,"
used in section 09.25.120, also includes the common law "public inter-
est" exception to the general requirement of disclosure.
After examining the legislative history of sections 09.25.110 and
09.25.120, the Alaska Supreme Court in City ofKenai v. Kenai Penin-
sula Newspapers74 concluded that the history "demonstrates that the
coverage of the common law [on public records] has consistently been
accepted by the legislators of this state."'75 Following an examination
of the common law of other jurisdictions, the court then indicated that
it would recognize an exception to the requirement of disclosure when-
ever a demonstrable need for confidentiality outweighs the public in-
terest in disclosure.76
The essence of this "public interest" exception is that in some
situations the need for confidentiality outweighs the public's right to
know what its government is doing. Thus, to determine whether doc-
uments are exempt under this exception, a balancing test must always
be performed. In discussing this balancing test, the Alaska Supreme
Court quoted with approval the standard enunciated by the Oregon
Supreme Court in MacEwan v. Holm.7 7 The MacEwan court stated:
In determining whether the records should be made available for
inspection in any particular instance, the court must balance the
interest of the citizen in knowing what the servants of government
are doing and the citizen's proprietary interest in public property,
liberty to recognize the common law "public interest" exception; instead, only statu-
tory exceptions can be recognized. Id. at 988.
71. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Stone v. Consolidated Publishing Co., 404 So. 2d 678 (Ala. 1981);
New Mexico ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236 (1977).
In Stone, the court stated:
Recorded information received by a public officer in confidence, sensitive
personnel records, pending criminal investigations, and records the disclo-
sure of which would be detrimental to the best interests of the public are
some of the areas which may not be subject to public disclosure. Courts
must balance the interest of the citizens in knowing what their public officers
are doing in the discharge of public duties against the interest of the general
public in having the business of government carried on efficiently and with-
out undue interference.
404 So. 2d at 681 (citation omitted).
73. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
74. 642 P.2d 1316 (Alaska 1982).
75. Id. at 1319.
76. Id. at 1323-24.
77. 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961).
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against the interest of the public in having the business of govern-
ment carried on efficiently and without undue interference. The ini-
tial decision as to whether inspection will be permitted must, of
course, rest with the custodian of the records. And since the justifi-
cation for a refusal to permit inspection will depend upon the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, we can offer no specific guide for
that administrative decision ....
In balancing the interest referred to above, the scales must re-
flect the fundamental right of a citizen to have access to the public
records and the incidental right of the agency to be free from unrea-
sonable interference. As the required burden of proof in this type of
case indicates, however, the citizen's interest is the predominant
one. In short, the burden is cast upon the agency to explain why the
requested records should not be furnished. Ultimately, of course,
the courts decide whether the agency explanation is reasonable and
weigh the respective benefits of non-disclosure and access. 78
With respect to this balancing test, the Alaska Supreme Court
then stated: "In striking a proper balance[,] the custodian of the
records in the first instance, and the court in the next, should bear in
mind that the legislature has expressed a bias in favor of public disclo-
sure. Doubtful cases should be resolved by permitting public inspec-
tion."' 79 In Carter v. Alaska Public Employees Association, 80 in which a
university appealed from a judgment ordering it to provide a union
with a list of employees, the Alaska Supreme Court again briefly ad-
dressed this issue and once more discussed approvingly the MacEwan
balancing process. The Carter court noted that the "balancing process
that precedes disclosure would protect information.., on a showing
that disclosure would ultimately harm the public welfare." 8'
The MacEwan court correctly noted the impossibility of stating
definitively what documents should not be disclosed as a matter of
public interest8 2 Nonetheless, a few examples can be identified: pend-
ing investigations,8 3 information received in confidence by a public of-
ficer,8 4 drafts and working notes of agencies acting in their quasi-
78. City of Kenai, 642 P.2d at 1323 (quoting MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. at 45-46,
359 P.2d at 421-22 (citations omitted)).
79. Id.
80. 663 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1983).
81. Id. at 921 n.15.
82. MacEwan, 26 Or. at 46-47, 359 P.2d at 421.
83. Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893 (1952).
84. Pantos v. City & County of San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 3d 258, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 489 (1984). As the court noted in New Mexico ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90
N.M. 790, 798, 568 P.2d 1236, 1244 (1977), however: "The promise of confidentiality
standing alone would not suffice to preclude disclosure. The promise would have to
coincide with reasonable justification, based on public policy, for refusing to release
the records ......
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judicial capacity,85 and confidential attorney-client communications. s6
Once again, however, these materials are not automatically exempt
from disclosure. Instead, a balancing test must be applied to deter-
mine whether withholding the materials from public inspection is ap-
propriate.8 7 Furthermore, the public interest exception cannot be used
to ignore a statutory mandate of disclosure or nondisclosure. Any
statute requiring public records to be kept confidential or requiring
public records to be made available for inspection supersedes a com-
mon law analysis. 88
C. Some Practical Considerations Relating
to Confidential Documents
The determination that a document is confidential and cannot be
made available for inspection under section 09.25.120 may raise as
many issues as it resolves. These issues include the point in time at
which documents cease to be confidential, whether an agency can dis-
close confidential documents to other government agencies, and the
procedures that should be followed by an agency if it determines that a
requested document contains confidential information.
1. When Documents Cease to be ConfidentiaL One of the most
unsettled questions in the area of public records is whether documents
that are exempt from disclosure at one point in time become subject to
inspection at a later date. If confidentiality was claimed pursuant to a
statute requiring the material to be kept confidential, the material is
presumably confidential for all time.89 Similarly, if confidentiality
85. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) ("The integrity of the adminis-
trative process must be ... respected.").
86. Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968). But see Wait v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 372 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1979) (in which the court held that the judicially created
privileges for attorney-client communications and "work product" do not constitute
exceptions to the state's records inspection statutes).
87. Special comment may be appropriate regarding draft documents. The disclo-
sure of the vast majority of draft documents prepared by public employees will not
ultimately harm the public welfare. There may, however, be very unusual circum-
stances in which the disclosure of a draft document would cause substantial and ad-
verse effects to the public welfare. In these situations, if the harm associated with
disclosure outweighs the public's interest in knowing what its government is doing,
the request for inspection should be denied under the public interest exception.
88. ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.010 (1982).
89. See Hiss v. Department of Justice, 441 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (even
though grand jury proceeding occurred more than 30 years ago, record of proceedings
remains confidential). Several states have statutes specifying a period of time after
which all confidential records become subject to disclosure. See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. § 5-14-3-4(e) (Bums 1987) (75 years, with the exception of adoption records);
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 378.300 (Michie 1986) (50 years). In Alaska, the only such
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arose under the right of privacy, the records cannot be disclosed to the
public without the consent of the affected individual for as long as the
right of privacy continues to be implicated. 90 If, however, confidenti-
ality were claimed pursuant to a statute authorizing nondisclosure, or
pursuant to the common law "public interest" exception, the records
probably do become disclosable at some time. The answer to the ques-
tion of when such documents become available lies in the same balanc-
ing test that was used to determine confidentiality in the first instance.
Specifically, with the passage of time, has the public's interest in know-
ing the contents of the records become greater than the government's
interest in nondisclosure? If so, the document should be made avail-
able for inspection.
2. Disclosure of Confidential Records to Other Agencies. The
proper analysis to be used in determining whether an agency may
share confidential information with other agencies depends upon the
law providing for such confidentiality.9 ' The common law "public in-
terest" exception to the records inspection statutes requires agencies to
deny a request for inspection when disclosure of the records would
ultimately harm the public welfare. Necessarily, then, if the exception
is found applicable, the records should not be released to the public.
On the other hand, it also follows that government agencies have the
authority to disclose these records to other agencies when such disclo-
sure is in the public's interest. An example of this is the records of the
telemetry radio frequencies of animals collared by the Alaska Depart-
ment of Fish and Game. Disclosure of these records to the general
public is against the public interest because of the substantial possibil-
ity that the information will be used to hunt the animals. Disclosure
to federal agencies with which the department cooperates on various
tracking projects, however, is permissible because this sharing of infor-
mation would assist the department in its research and management
efforts.
When an agency concludes that disclosure is prohibited by the
constitutional right of privacy, that agency cannot release the records
statute is ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.310 (1986), which specifies that birth records become
subject to inspection under ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.120 after 100 years, and death,
marriage, divorce, dissolution of marriage and annulment records become subject to
inspection after 50 years.
90. See Church of Scientology v. City of Phoenix Police Dep't, 122 Ariz. 338,
340, 594 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1979) (records over 20 years old available for inspection
because, with passage of time, disclosure would not impair any investigation or invade
the privacy rights of persons discussed).
91. Obviously, when the source of the law providing for confidentiality is a stat-
ute, the terms of the statute govern the release of the information both to the public
and to other agencies.
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to the public without the permission of the affected individual. 92
Under certain circumstances, however, agencies may share this type of
confidential information with each other.93 The most important con-
siderations are whether this sharing of information will be helpful in
achieving an important public purpose and whether confidentiality can
be maintained by the receiving agency. The determination as to
whether one agency may share with another information that impli-
cates a person's right of privacy must be made individually in each
case, taking into account the particular circumstances.
3. Procedural Issues. When a member of the public requests to
see records under section 09.25.120, the agency having custody of the
documents should follow the procedures outlined in the regulations
implementing the records inspection statutes. 94 An agency official
must review the documents to determine whether they contain confi-
dential material. If the file contains both disclosable information and
confidential material, the confidential information should be deleted,
and the remaining information released. 95
The regulations do not address how nondisclosable information
should be deleted. When only a portion of a document is determined
not to be disclosable, the obvious practical solution is for that page to
be photocopied with the confidential information covered. If, how-
ever, the entire document is nondisclosable, then the document should
be removed from the file while the file is being inspected. Under either
circumstance, however, the person seeking disclosure should be in-
formed when material is being withheld and be given an explanation of
the reason for the withholding. Thus, if a member of the public re-
quests in writing to see a file that contains nondisclosable information,
a written statement should be prepared stating something to the effect
that, "under applicable law, certain information has been deleted from
the file because its disclosure (at this time) would (violate a person's
right of privacy) (violate a specified statute) (be against the public in-
terest insofar as ... )." The explanation, moreover, should be as de-
tailed as possible.96
92. See Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 Ill. 2d 107, 121-22, 390 N.E.2d 835, 841 (Ill. 1979)
(owner of property must be given notice and opportunity to be heard before building
inspection records released).
93. See Hinderliter v. Humphries, 224 Va. 439, 449, 297 S.E.2d 684, 689 (1982)
(not improper for records to have been disclosed by police chief to county executive
and then by county executive to county board of supervisors).
94. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 95.010(d) (Apr. 1984).
95. Id. § 95.080 (Jan. 1983).
96. An agency's final decision to deny inspection of public records or writings is
reviewable by the courts, as is any final administrative decision. This would be accom-
plished by an administrative appeal of the determination not to allow inspection. See
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D. Summary
Although public inspection of government records in Alaska is
the standard, the applicable statutes are not clear in identifying the
exceptions to this rule of disclosure. After listing exceptions for vital
statistics and adoption proceedings records, records pertaining to
juveniles, and medical and related public health records, section
09.25.120 almost blithely provides another exception for "records re-
quired to be kept confidential by a federal law or regulation or by state
law." The exception for records required to be kept confidential by
state law presents several complex issues. There are more than 100
scattered statutes that require or authorize designated records to be
kept confidential. In addition, there are a few implied statutory excep-
tions to the requirement of disclosure. Furthermore, the constitu-
tional right of privacy may prohibit the disclosure of various
documents. Finally, the common law public interest exception pro-
hibits the disclosure of records when a demonstrable need for confi-
dentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
These numerous exceptions, however, do not render the records
inspection statutes meaningless. In fact, the vast majority of docu-
ments are available for inspection. It is only when a specific exception
can be identified that a document may be withheld from the public.
Moreover, many statutes, as well as the right of privacy and the com-
mon law public interest exception, require a balancing test to be per-
formed which may lead to the conclusion that the document should be
disclosed.
IV. THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
Evidentiary privileges are quite distinct from exceptions to the
records inspection statutes. Whether a government record is privi-
leged from discovery in litigation is governed in the first instance by
the Alaska Rules of Evidence. Alaska Evidence Rule 501 provides as
follows:
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or of this state, by enactments of the Alaska Legislature, or
by these or other rules promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court,
no person, organization, or entity has a privilege to ... refuse to
produce any object or writing .... 97
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 95.120 (Jan. 1983); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.560
(1984); ALASKA APP. R. 601-611.
97. ALASKA R. EVID. 501. This means that privileges recognized at common law
are not applicable in this state unless they have been adopted in the Alaska Rules of
Evidence or by statute or they are required to be recognized under the state or federal
constitution. The common law public interest exception to the records inspection
statutes has not been recognized in the Alaska Rules of Evidence, or in any statute,
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The privileges for documents recognized in the Alaska Rules of
Evidence generally speak for themselves.98 Whether a statute creates
an evidentiary privilege for a government record depends upon its
terms. 99 Furthermore, there are few constitutionally based privileges
that can affect the discovery of government records. Thus, there is
little need to analyze the vast majority of privileges that may be in-
voked to resist discovery. 100 The constitutionally based deliberative
process privilege, however, is worthy of extensive review, given its
complicated nature and recent recognition in Alaska.
The executive or, better termed, deliberative process privilege 0 1
can be claimed only by the government in limited circumstances.102
Broadly speaking, the privilege protects from discovery "predeci-
sional" documents prepared by members of the executive branch that
reflect the decisionmaking or deliberative process of the govern-
ment.103 The applicability of the privilege arises, however, not from
the nature of the documents as drafts, but instead from other addi-
tional circumstances surrounding the situation that make nondisclo-
sure necessary. 1 4 The purpose of the deliberative process privilege is
to encourage candor and the free flow of information in the process of
and it is not constitutionally based. Accordingly, it cannot be claimed as a privilege to
shield government records from discovery in litigation.
98. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 502 ("Required Reports Privileged by Statute");
ALASKA R. EVID. 503 ("Lawyer-Client Privilege"); ALASKA R. EvID. 509 ("Identity
of Informer").
99. Various statutes specifically indicate that certain materials are privileged. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.27.120 (1984) (information contained in a notice of termina-
tion of an appointment by an insurer is "privileged and is not admissible as evidence in
an action or proceeding against the insurer"); id. § 13.26.109 (1985) (statements of a
ward or respondent made in the course of evaluations and examinations under
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.090-.155 (1985 & Supp. 1987) are "privileged, confidential,
and not admissible" without the ward's or respondent's consent except in proceedings
under these statutory sections).
100. A good source of general information on evidentiary privileges is S. STONE &
R. LIEBMAN, supra note 22.
101. Most jurisdictions have labeled this privilege the "executive privilege" for de-
liberative process documents. See supra note 23. This term is confusing, however,
because over the years it has been used to refer to many different things, including
privilege from testifying, Elson v. Bowen, 83 Nev. 515, 520, 436 P.2d 12, 15 (1967),
and privilege from suit for defamation, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Sheridan
v. Crisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d 359, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161 (N.Y. App. 1964).
Furthermore, the governor's "executive privilege," as the chief executive of the state,
is broader than the privilege for other members of the executive. For example, many
of the governor's notes are privileged even if they are not "deliberative." Hamilton v.
Verdow, 287 Md. 549, 563-66, 414 A.2d 914, 924-25 (1980). Accordingly, in this
article the term "deliberative process privilege" is used whenever possible, reserving
the term "executive privilege" for discussions of privileges special to the governor.
102. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 22, at 497-99.
103. Id. at 506.
104. Id.
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shaping policies and making decisions. 10 5 Nonetheless, the privilege is
qualified, rather than absolute. It therefore cannot be claimed unless
the state's need for confidentiality exceeds the litigant's need to know
the contents of the documents.106 Accordingly, the proper balancing
test must be performed before the privilege is claimed.107
Over the years, the deliberative process privilege has received
considerable attention from federal and many state courts. In Alaska,
however, it has just recently received recognition.' 0  In light of
Alaska's avowed commitment to open government, 0 9 Alaska courts
probably will take a narrower view of the privilege than have some
other courts. 10 Before discussing the limitations that Alaska courts
are likely to place on the privilege, however, an examination of the
privilege as it has been recognized by other jurisdictions is
appropriate.
A. Recognition by Federal Courts
For decades, federal courts have recognized the deliberative pro-
cess privilege as a common law evidentiary privilege."' Currently, the
privilege is addressed most frequently in the context of whether the
documents being sought are exempt from disclosure under the provi-
sions of the Freedom of Information Act,"12 one section of which pro-
vides an exemption from disclosure for an "inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandum which would not be available by law to a
party.' 113
105. Id. at 508-09.
106. Id. at 507-08.
107. Id. at 508.
108. Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska 1986).
109. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.310-.312 (Supp. 1987); Doe, 721 P.2d at 622.
110. See infra section IV(D).
111. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939
(Ct. Cl. 1958); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.
1966), aff'd sub nor. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
Because federal courts recognize common law evidentiary privileges (unlike
Alaska and some other states), they have not had much occasion to focus on whether
the deliberative process privilege is constitutionally based. The United States Supreme
Court, however, has specifically ruled that the President's executive privilege is "inex-
tricably rooted in the separation of powers under the [Federal] Constitution." United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
112. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
113. Id. § 552(b)(5) (emphasis added). This phrase has been interpreted by the
federal courts as creating an exception for documents that would be privileged from
discovery in litigation. FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 26 (1983); Federal Open
Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 359 (1979).
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The rationale for the deliberative process privilege, however, was
discussed more generally in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v.
United States114 as follows:
Free and open comments on the advantages and disadvantages of a
proposed course of governmental management would be adversely
affected if the civil servant were compelled by publicity to bear the
blame for errors or bad judgment properly chargeable to the respon-
sible individual with power to decide and act. Government from its
nature has necessarily been granted a certain freedom from control
beyond that given the citizen. It is true that it now submits itself to
suit but it must retain privileges for the good of all.
There is public policy involved in this claim of privilege for this
advisory opinion-the policy of open, frank discussion between
subordinate and chief concerning administrative action.115
The United States Supreme Court has also commented on the
privilege and has emphasized that documents that are covered by the
privilege remain protected even after a final decision is reached in the
matter.'16 The rationale for this conclusion is that "disclosure at any
time could inhibit the free flow of advice, including analysis, reports,
and expression of opinion within the agency."11 7
Commentators Stone and Liebman capture the essence of this
privilege, as recognized by the federal courts, as follows:
The privilege belongs to the government, rather than to individual
officeholders ....
The primary rationale for the privilege for intragovernmental
opinions is that effective and efficient governmental decision making
depends on the free and uninhibited flow of ideas, and that candor
will be stifled if officials know that their advice may be revealed to
outsiders. A subsidiary rationale, derived from the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers, is that the judiciary is not author-
ized to probe the mental processes of an executive or administrative
officer. Thus, a document is protected if its disclosure would reveal
"the methods by which a decision is reached, the matters consid-
ered, the contributing influences, or the role played by the work of
others." It follows from this second rationale that as "a general
rule, the lower the level of abstraction in the writing, the less the
need for the privilege." Of course, documents compiled by lower
officials are more likely to be factual in nature and compiled prior to
the start of any policy oriented deliberative process. Hence, such
documents are less likely to require protection under either of the
two rationales underlying the privilege.
The ultimate purpose of the privilege is "to prevent injury to
the quality of agency decisions." Its particular purposes are (1) to
114. 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
115. Id. at 945-46 (footnote omitted).
116. Federal Open Mkt. Comm, 443 U.S. at 360.
117. Id.
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encourage open, frank discussions on policy matters between subor-
dinates and their superiors by assuaging fear of public ridicule or
criticism; (2) to protect against premature disclosure of proposed
policies before they have been finally formulated or adopted; and
(3) to protect against confusing the issues and misleading the public
by disclosure of reasons that were not in fact the actual reasons for
the agency's actions....
The paradigm of a document clearly within the scope of the
privilege would be a memorandum containing an exhaustive exami-
nation of alternatives in a particular policy area prepared for a high
agency official at the final stages of an agency's deliberations. The
scope of the privilege is not so narrowly confined, however. It has
been held to extend to "recommendations, draft documents, propos-
als, suggestions, and other subjective documents which reflect the
personal opinion of the writer rather than the policy of the
agency." 118
B. Recognition by State Courts
Several state courts have recognized the deliberative process priv-
ilege as an evidentiary privilege. Probably the first state to discuss
fully the deliberative process privilege was New Jersey. In Nero v. Hy-
land, 119 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the privilege applies
to information gathered at the request of the governor concerning a
potential appointee, who wanted to see the file following the gover-
nor's decision not to appoint him. 120 The court, which held that the
privilege is qualified and that a balancing test must be used, concluded
that the need for effective pre-appointment screening was more impor-
tant than the possibility that the unappointed person had been unjustly
censured.' 2' The court noted that confidentiality would not only pro-
tect the sources who supplied information, but also enhance the effec-
tiveness of the investigatory procedures. 122 Discussing the privilege in
general, the court stated:
A vital public interest is clearly involved in the effectiveness of the
decision-making and investigatory duties of the executive.... A
qualified privilege for communications relating to the executive
function promotes the effective discharge of these constitutional du-
ties while ensuring that, in appropriate circumstances, disclosure of
the privileged material will be forthcoming. 12 3
118. S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 22, at 508-10 (footnotes omitted).
119. 76 N.J. 213, 386 A.2d 846 (1978).
120. Id. at 227, 386 A.2d at 853.
121. Id. at 226, 386 A.2d at 853.
122. Id. at 225, 386 A.2d at 853.
123. Id. at 226, 386 A.2d at 853 (citations omitted).
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Without addressing the issue, the New Jersey court simply as-
sumed that the privilege extends to a private individual's communica-
tions with members of the executive branch. 24 Finally, the Nero
court also noted that the statement made by the governor at a press
conference that the appointment was not recommended because of in-
formation obtained as a result of the investigation was not a waiver of
the privilege, nor did it justify release of the material. 125
Another state that has judicially recognized the deliberative pro-
cess privilege is Maryland. In Hamilton v. Verdow, 12 6 the Maryland
Court of Appeals equated the governor to the President of the United
States and concluded that the governor has similar privileges under
the state constitution. 127 The court cited United States v. Aaron
Burr, 128 authored by Chief Justice Marshall, as the beginning of the
deliberative process privilege. The Maryland court concluded that the
privilege arises both under the common law and the state constitution
and is a part of the law of the state under its constitutional separation
of powers provisions. 129
Another decision, that of the New Mexico Supreme Court in New
Mexico ex rel. Attorney General v. First Judicial District Court,130 is
particularly instructive because New Mexico has adopted the same
rule on evidentiary privileges as Alaska. In New Mexico, as in Alaska,
a privilege that is not set out in the evidence code or in a statute will
not be recognized unless such recognition is required by the state or
federal Constitution.131
The dispute before the New Mexico Supreme Court arose over
the attempts by several litigants to discover an investigatory fie pre-
pared by the attorney general's office at the request of the governor, on
the cause of a riot at the state penitentiary. Using a separation of pow-
ers analysis, the court held that in order to safeguard the decisionmak-
ing process of the government it was required to recognize the
deliberative process privilege under the state constitution. 132 The
court then concluded that the attorney general is a member of the
executive department, and as such has the right to claim the privilege.
This conclusion reflects the court's belief that the privilege extends to
other high-ranking members of the executive department, and not just
124. See id. at 225-26, 386 A.2d at 852-53.
125. Id. at 227, 386 A.2d at 853.
126. 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980).
127. Id. at 556, 414 A.2d at 921.
128. 25 Fed. Cas. 187 (C.C. Va. 1807).
129. 287 Md. at 562, 414 A.2d at 924.
130. 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330 (1981).
131. Id. at 257, 629 P.2d at 333.
132. Id. at 257-58, 629 P.2d at 333-34.
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the governor.13 3 The court emphasized, however, that the privilege is
not absolute and requires a balancing of interests.134
Surprisingly, the court in New Mexico ex rel. Attorney General
held that the privilege does not extend to communications between the
attorney general and persons who are not members of the executive
branch. 135 The court concluded that these communications were pro-
tected only by the common law "public interest" privilege, which
could not be recognized because of the rule in New Mexico's evidence
code that common law privileges are inapplicable in the state. 136 This
holding has been criticized by one commentator:
This restrictive definition of the scope of executive privilege is not
supported by case law or commentators. It is generally understood
that the privilege extends to communications from without the ex-
ecutive branch as well as to communications within the executive
branch itself. Thus, the New Mexico court should have applied the
doctrine of executive privilege here.137
C. General Limitations on the Privilege
Significant limitations on the privilege have been noted by the
United States Supreme Court. The Court has emphasized that neither
an agency's final decision, nor documents that express policy determi-
nations and interpretations that have already been adopted by the
agency, are protected.13 8 Similarly, instructions to staff members that
affect the public, or a single member of the public, are not
protected. 139
At least as importantly, factual information is not protected from
disclosure, even though such information is part of a "deliberative"
document. 14 As an exception to this, however, factual information
may be kept confidential if it is inextricably linked to policymaking
processes. 141
133. Id. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334. Cf Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1
(1957) (county prosecutor not so directly under influence of governor as to automati-
cally qualify him as a member of executive for purpose of privilege).
134. 96 N.M. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334.
135. Id. at 259, 629 P.2d at 335.
136. Id. at 260, 629 P.2d at 336.
137. Comment, Public Interest Privilege: From Crown Privilege to FOIA, 23 ARIZ.
L. RExv. 1131, 1141 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
138. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 152-53 (1975).
139. Id.
140. See McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1974); In re
Franklin Nat'l Bank Secs. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
141. See generally S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 22, at 506-08.
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D. Application in Alaska
When adopting the Rules of Evidence, the Alaska Supreme Court
rejected a proposal to include the common law "official information"
privilege, which basically would have protected the same types of doc-
uments that are covered in other jurisdictions by the deliberative pro-
cess privilege. 142 The commentary to the rule indicates that the
rationale for the privilege was "not convincing." 143 This commentary
specifically noted, however, that the rules "do not attempt to decide
whether the doctrine of separation of powers implies a constitutionally
based executive privilege." 144 That question has subsequently been an-
swered: "[lit is generally acknowledged that some form of 'executive
privilege' is a necessary concomitant to executive power. Such disa-
greement as does exist among the various authorities relates to the
extent of the privilege and to the question of who decides when the
privilege is being properly invoked."' 145
In Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 146 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the governor has a qualified "executive privilege," based on
the separation of powers provisions of the state constitution, to refuse
to disclose in litigation certain internal government communications
that reveal his deliberative and mental processes. Although this deci-
sion is obviously significant, it is of limited usefulness in most situa-
tions likely to arise because of its blending of the executive and
deliberative process privileges. In short, for all of the issues it ad-
dresses, it leaves as many unresolved.
The underlying facts of the case were as follows. In 1981, a va-
cancy on the State Medical Board arose, which Governor Hammond
was to fill by appointment. At some point, his press secretary an-
nounced Dr. Carolyn Brown's appointment to the position. In re-
sponse to this announcement, Alaska-Right-To-Life, Inc. published an
article in its "hot line," urging readers to protest this appointment be-
cause of Brown's perceived pro-abortion stance. The Governor re-
ceived sixty-five letters and telegrams, some of which expressed
opposition to Brown's appointment. Thereafter, the Governor apolo-
gized to Brown for the "erroneous announcement" of her appoint-
ment, stating that he would be appointing a person recommended by
the State Medical Association. Brown sued Alaska-Right-To-Life for
142. ALASKA R. EvID. commentary at 107.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 109-10.
145. Annotation, Construction and Application, under State Law, of Doctrine of
"Executive Privilege," 10 A.L.R. 4TH 355, 357 (1981).
146. 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska 1986).
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defamation. In the course of discovery, she sought production of Gov-
ernor Hammond's file. Both the state and the defendant objected. Af-
ter the superior court ordered production, the order was challenged in
a petition for review ified with the Alaska Supreme Court.147
Relying on many of the authorities previously discussed, the
supreme court recognized a privilege for the Governor's records,
which would protect his deliberative mental processes. 148 The court
held, however, that "[i]n each case a court must balance the govern-
ment's interest in confidentiality against the need for disclosure to in-
sure the effective functioning of the judicial system."'149 Applying this
balancing test, the court concluded that the "internal communica-
tions" contained in Governor Hammond's file were privileged. 50 It
concluded, however, that unsolicited letters from members of the pub-
lic were not.' 5 ' The court noted that "[w]hen citizen letter-writers 'go
public' by writing to a government official concerning a public issue,
they lose their expectation of confidentiality, as do the government
officials who write in response."' 152
The court then addressed important procedural aspects of claim-
ing the privilege:
It is well established that when a formal, specific claim of executive
privilege is asserted, a presumptive privilege attaches .... How-
ever, the claim of privilege must satisfy strict procedural require-
ments .... In particular, the government must specifically identify
and describe the documents sought to be protected and explain
when they fall within the scope of the executive privilege. Since a
court usually must rely on an affidavit of the responsible department
head for information necessary to determine whether to recognize
the privilege, the affidavit should be based on personal examination
of the documents by the affiant official .... The party seeking
discovery then must make a sufficient showing that the need for
production outweighs the interest in confidentiality .... Upon such
a showing, the trial court should review the documents in camera
before deciding whether to order production. In the absence of
such a showing, a claim of privilege should be honored without re-
quiring an in camera inspection. 153
The court further noted that the state must "specifically identify the
memoranda or papers, [and] indicate whether the documents [contain]
internal opinions or recommendations."' 154 It is not sufficient for the
147. Id. at 619-20.
148. Id. at 622-26.
149. Id. at 623 (footnote omitted).
150. Id. at 624, 625.
151. Id. at 625.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 626 (citations omitted).
154. Id.
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state to focus on the file "as a whole" and assert a privilege "as to the
entire contents."' 155
Although various questions were left unanswered in Doe, the
court did clearly indicate that it will not embrace the broadest possible
scope of the privilege. It stated that "the policy embodied in the pub-
lic records statute of promoting citizen access to government docu-
ments argues for limiting the scope of the executive privilege
doctrine."1 56
One specific question not decided in Doe is whether a letter or
report directly solicited by a public official, accompanied by an implied
or express promise of confidentiality, is protected from disclosure.' 57
The court acknowledged, however, that other jurisdictions have recog-
nized the applicability of the privilege in such circumstances. 58 As
previously indicated, this is consistent with the rationale of the
privilege.159
The most significant question left unanswered in Doe, however, is
whether the court will recognize the deliberative process privilege for
lower-ranking state officials, or will instead limit the privilege to the
governor and perhaps the cabinet. There are indications in the Doe
opinion that on this issue the court is willing to accept the broader
deliberative process privilege. For example, the court refers to the
"deliberative and mental processes of decision-makers.' 60 It also de-
scribed the rationale for the privilege as being "the need to encourage
candid opinions and debate among government officials during the de-
cision-making process."' 61 These references to "decisionmakers" and
"government officials" suggest that the court recognizes that there
may be various situations in which the privilege should be recognized
for lower-ranking members of the executive, as well as for the gover-
nor and the cabinet.
The easiest extension of the privilege to predict is that it will be
recognized to protect from public disclosure the drafts and working
notes of an agency acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Although there
is no explicit authority protecting courts' drafts of decisions and delib-
eration notes, these materials are recognized as privileged. In United
155. Id.
156. Id. at 625.
157. Id. at 630 n.19.
158. Id. at 625 (citing Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980)
(solicited investigative report privileged); New Mexico ex rel. Attorney General v.
First Judicial District Court, 96 N.M. 254, 629 P.2d 330 (1981) (statements of prison
guards and inmates given on promise of confidentiality privileged); Hafermehl v. Uni-
versity of Washington, 29 Wash. App. 366, 628 P.2d 846 (1981) (letter from co-faculty
not discoverable by professor denied promotion)).
159. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
160. 721 P.2d at 622-23 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 625 (emphasis added).
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States v. Morgan, 162 the United States Supreme Court noted: "Just as
a judge cannot be subjected to such scrutiny,... so the integrity of the
administrative process must be equally respected." 163 This analogy to
the privilege that unquestionably exists for the judiciary should be a
persuasive argument in favor of recognizing the deliberative process
privilege for the executive branch when it is functioning in a quasi-
judicial capacity. 164
It has been suggested that the burden of establishing the privilege
should be placed on the government when the information does not
"directly affect the functioning of the executive at the highest level." 165
This suggestion likely will be adopted by Alaska courts because it fur-
thers the state's goal of an open government without unduly impinging
upon the functioning of the executive branch. Accordingly, the state
must be prepared to justify its conclusion that documents sought
through discovery should not be released on the basis of this privilege.
An issue about which predictions are difficult to make is whether
Alaska courts will adopt the rule recognized in other jurisdictions that
predecisional documents remain privileged if not adopted by the de-
partment or agency. 166 There is some possibility that the courts will
hold that documents must be disclosed once a final decision is reached
on the issue, whether the decision embraces or rejects the discussion
contained in the draft. Again, this would further the goal of open
government. Arguably, however, requiring the disclosure of such doc-
uments could inhibit candid discussions on matters of considerable
state importance and Alaska courts could conclude that the privilege
should be recognized in such circumstances.
It is possible to identify certain examples of the types of delibera-
tive process documents that could be encompassed by Doe, if the bal-
ancing test weighs in favor of nondisclosure. These examples include:
162. 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
163. Id. at 422.
164. One federal court has stated:
Thejudicary.. .is not authorized "to probe the mental processes" of an exec-
utive or adminstrative officer. This statutory rule forecloses investigation
into the methods by which a decision is reached, the matters considered, the
contributing influences, or the role played by the work of others - results
demanded by the exigencies of the most imperative character. No judge
could tolerate an inquisition into the elements comprising his decision -
indeed, "[s]uch an examination of a judge would be destructive of judicial
responsibility" - and by the same token "the integrity of the administrative
process must be equally respected."
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325-26 (D.D.C. 1966),
aff'd sub non. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 952 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
165. Annotation, Construction and Application, under State Law, of Doctrine of
"Executive Privilege, " 10 A.L.R. 4TH 355, 358 (1981).
166. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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memoranda that advocate certain positions, examine alternatives to
existing policies, or express opinions on highly sensitive policy ques-
tions; analyses of public or political perception to a position; and rec-
ommendations, proposals, suggestions, and other subjective writings
that reflect the personal opinion of the author rather than the policy of
the state. 167 Clearly, documents such as these, when directed to the
governor, fall within the ambit of protection. Furthermore, it is highly
likely that these types of documents might also be privileged when
directed to the head of a department.
Less certain is whether these documents will be afforded protec-
tion when directed to lower-ranking decisionmakers, such as deputy
commissioners, directors, and deputy directors. The more removed
the situation is from the classic example of the executive privilege, the
more attention should be paid to the court's observation in Doe that
there are policy reasons in this state for limiting the scope of the privi-
lege. 168 The only documents certain to be found within the scope of
the deliberative process privilege, regardless of the level of the execu-
tive for which they are prepared, are drafts of documents relating to a
quasi-judicial matter that has not been finally decided.169
Identifying the types of documents that could be subject to this
privilege, however, is only the starting point in analyzing whether a
document will be found privileged by the Alaska courts. Examples of
documents that other courts have held to be privileged include ap-
praisal reports, 170 unadopted draft proposed regulations for the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, 17 1 documents reflecting negotiations for the
settlement of a contract claim, 172 nonbinding budgetary recommenda-
tions,' 73 records reflecting the basis for a decision whether to grant
furlough to a prisoner,1'4 and letters from faculty members opposing
the promotion of an associate professor.' 75 It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that the Alaska courts would agree that all of these situations
warranted recognition of the privilege because it is difficult to believe
167. See generally S. STONE & R. LEIBMAN, supra note 22, at 506, 509, 510-11
(citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, 363 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1966);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 520 F. Supp. 414 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); In re
Franklin Nat'l Bank Secs. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
168. 721 P.2d at 625.
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
170. Hoover v. United States, 611 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980).
171. Pies v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 668 F.2d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
172. Murphy v. TVA, 571 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1983).
173. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs v. United States Dep't of Justice, 742 F.2d 1484 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
174. Schumate v. Wilson, 90 A.D.2d 832, 456 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
175. Hafermehl v. University of Washington, 29 Wash. App. 366, 628 P.2d 846
(1981).
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that nondisclosure of all of these types of documents is necessary for
effective governing or would serve any "strong public interest.' 76
A document will only be privileged if its disclosure would reveal
the methods by which a decision is reached, the matters considered,
the contributing influences, or the role played by others, and if the
state's need for confidentiality outweighs the party's need for disclo-
sure.177 Determining if a writing is covered by this privilege depends
ultimately on whether disclosure would cause significant adverse ef-
fects to the state and whether the need for confidentiality exceeds the
opposing party's need for disclosure. In this state, in which the courts
have repeatedly indicated that disclosure is the standard, and not the
exception, it should be apparent that few documents will be protected
by this privilege. There must be more at issue than the simple desire
to avoid embarrassment or a belief that the public would misinterpret
the disclosed documents.
V. CONCLUSION
Almost all government records are subject to discovery in litiga-
tion under the rules of evidence and available for inspection by the
public under the state's records inspection statutes. There are, how-
ever, various laws requiring records to be kept confidential. Further-
more, there are circumstances when disclosure would be against the
public interest or violate an individual's right to privacy. In these situ-
ations, the documents must be withheld from inspection. Similar limi-
tations exist under the state's rules of evidence.
Nonetheless, to the extent that records are privileged or exempt
from public disclosure, Alaska courts probably will narrowly construe
the privilege or exemption and place limitations on it at least as re-
strictive as those developed by the courts of other jurisdictions. These
limitations reflect a healthy concern that the need for effective govern-
ment must be balanced with the public's right to know what its gov-
ernment is doing. The Alaska courts can be expected to resolve the
tension between these two competing interests by placing the burden
of establishing the need for nondisclosure upon the government.
Thus, when determining whether a particular document is subject to
inspection or discovery, the presumption lies in favor of disclosure.
176. City of Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula Newspapers, 42 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Alaska
1982).
177. See Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d 617, 623-25 (Alaska 1986); S.
STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 22, at 506, 509, 510-11.
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